According to Jacobsen’s book, AABIS aimed to cover 80% of the Afghan population by 2012, or around 25 million people. Although there is no publicly available information on how many records this database now contains, and neither the contractor managing the database nor officials from the US Department of Defense have responded to the requests for comment, an unconfirmed figure from the LinkedIn profile of his US-based company program manager puts it at 8.1 million records.
AABIS was used extensively in various ways by the previous Afghan government. Applications for government posts and positions in most projects required a biometric verification of the Home Office’s system to ensure applicants had no criminal or terrorist background. Biometric checks were also required for passport, national identity card and driver’s license applications, as well as for registrations for the country’s university entrance examination.
Another database, slightly smaller than AABIS, was connected to the “e-tazkira”, the country’s electronic national identity card. By the time the government fell, it had around 6.2 million pending claims, according to the National Statistics and Information Authority, although it is not clear how many applicants had previously submitted biometrics.
Biometrics have also been used – or at least made public – by other government departments. The Independent Election Commission used biometric scanners to try to prevent electoral fraud in the 2019 parliamentary elections, with questionable results. In 2020, the Ministry of Industry and Trade announcement that they would collect the biometric data of those who registered new businesses.
Despite the plethora of systems, they were never fully connected to each other. a August 2019 audit by the United States found that despite the $ 38 million spent to date, APPS had failed to meet many of its goals: biometrics was still not integrated directly into its personal records, but instead was bound by the unique biometric number. The system also did not connect directly to other computer systems of the Afghan government, such as that of the Ministry of Finance, which sent the salaries. APPS also still relied on manual data entry processes, the audit said, leaving room for human error or manipulation.
A global problem
Afghanistan is not the only country to adopt biometrics. Many countries are concerned about so-called “phantom beneficiaries” – false identities used to illegally raise wages or other funds. Preventing such fraud is a common rationale for biometric systems, says Amba Kak, director of global policies and programs at the AI Now institute and legal expert in biometric systems.
“It’s really easy to paint this [APPS] as exceptional, ”says Kak, who co-edited a book on global biometric policies. It “seems to have a lot of continuity with global experiences” around biometrics.
It is widely recognized that having legal identification documents is a right, but “mistaking biometric identification as the only effective means of legal identification is”, she says, “flawed and a little dangerous”.
Kak questions whether biometrics, rather than policy fixes, is the right solution to fraud, and adds that it is often “not based on evidence.”
But driven in large part by US military objectives and international funding, Afghanistan’s deployment of these technologies has been aggressive. Even though APPS and other databases had not yet reached the level of functionality they were intended for, they still contain many terabytes of data on Afghan citizens that the Taliban can mine.
“Identity domination” – but by whom?
The growing alarm over biometric devices and databases being left behind, and the tons of other data on ordinary life in Afghanistan, did not stop the collection of sensitive data from people in the two weeks between the Taliban’s entry into Kabul and the official withdrawal of US forces.
This time the data is collected mainly by well-meaning volunteers in insecure Google forms and spreadsheets, emphasizing either that the lessons on data security have not yet been learned or that they need to be relearned by each group involved.
Singh says the issue of what happens to data during conflict or government collapse needs more attention. “We don’t take it seriously,” he says, “But we should, especially in these war-torn areas where information can be used to create a lot of damage. “
Kak, the biometric law researcher, suggests that the best way to protect sensitive data might actually be that “these types of [data] the infrastructure … was not built in the first place.
For Jacobsen, the author and journalist, it’s ironic that the Defense Ministry’s obsession with using data to establish identity may actually help the Taliban achieve their own version of identity dominance. “It would be fear of what the Taliban are doing,” she said.
Ultimately, some experts say the fact that the Afghan government databases weren’t very interoperable could actually be a saving grace if the Taliban tried to use the data. “I suspect that the APPS is still not performing as well, which is probably a good thing in light of recent events,” Dan Grazier, a veteran who works in the Project on Government watchdog group, said via email. Oversight.
But for those logged into the APPS database, who may now find themselves or their family members being hunted down by the Taliban, it’s less irony and more betrayal.
“The Afghan military has trusted its international partners, including and led by the United States, to build a system like this,” said one person familiar with the system. “And now this database is going to be used as [new] government weapon.